Introduction *
Motivation. In a recent survey, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that 99% of online companies collect personal information from the individuals visiting their web sites (Seligman and Taylor, 2000) . An article on one-to-one web marketing reports that "Most sites obtain [consumer] profile data by observing behavior on the site, tracking purchase behavior, asking questions with forms, or all three" (Allen, 1999, p. 2). In September 2000, Amazon.com conducted dynamic-pricing experiments in which DVD movies were sold to different customers at different prices (up to 40% different) based on their purchasing histories (Streitfield, 2000) .1 What is more, such tailor-made prices are not restricted to transactions on the Internet. Banks, airlines, long-distance companies, and even grocery stores use modem information technology to track individual customers and make them personalized offers.2 Amazon was severely criticized by consumer privacy groups when news of its dynamicpricing experiment came to light. The company publicly apologized and made refunds to 6,896 customers. Nevertheless, as Streitfield (2000) observes, "With its detailed records on the buying of two monopolists is explored.6 The consumers possess heterogeneous private demands for the goods, but they are initially indistinguishable by the firms. Each consumer's valuations for the two goods are positively correlated. This implies that a consumer's purchasing decision at firm 1 is valuable information for firm 2. In particular, firm 2 may wish to raise (or lower) its offer to a consumer if it learns that he did (or did not) purchase from firm 1.7 I investigate two settings, a confidential regime in which firm 1 cannot sell or transfer customer information to firm 2, and a disclosure regime in which the sale of customer information is possible. Within the context of the disclosure regime, I explore two cases, one in which consumers are naive with regard to the sale of the customer list and one in which they fully anticipate it. In the case of naive consumers, I show that firm 1 often possesses incentives to charge high experimental prices in order to elicit information about its customers.8 If consumers are naive, then the firms prefer the disclosure regime to the confidential regime. Social surplus may be either lower or higher under the disclosure regime depending respectively on whether dynamic pricing leads to higher or lower average prices.
In the case when consumers anticipate sale of their information, some striking welfare reversals emerge. In particular, in equilibrium a fraction of consumers who have high valuations for both goods misrepresent their preferences by strategically refusing to buy from firm 1 if it sets a high price. This strategic-demand reduction has two important consequences. First, it undermines the market for customer information because it results in a worthless customer list. Second, it causes the effective demand facing firm 1 to be more elastic, often inducing it to post a lower price. Situations may occur, however, in which firm 1 nevertheless finds it optimal to post a high price. In this case, the deadweight loss associated with strategic-demand reduction adds to the inefficiency arising from monopoly pricing. When consumers fully anticipate sale of the customer list, the firms prefer the confidential regime to the disclosure regime. In particular, firm 1 would like to commit to a privacy policy under which it promises not to sell its customer list to firm 2.9 Of course, one need look no further than the landmark Toysmart case to see that such promises may be difficult to keep. Indeed, in the situation when firm 1 and firm 2 are actually a single entity selling a sequence of goods, it may be practically impossible to commit not to use customer information internally. o Related literature. The strategic-demand reduction that occurs in the model presented in this article is a manifestation of the celebrated rachet effect. In this context, the most relevant article is Hart and Tirole (1988) . These authors study a model of repeat purchases under conditions of private information by the consumer and imperfect commitment by the seller. In this setting, Hart and Tirole's findings are rather stark. Specifically, they find that under a long time horizon, the seller is generally compelled to charge a low price and to learn nothing until near the end of the game. This finding, however, has only limited connection with the model presented below, in which there are only two periods and where learning is incomplete because of the imperfect correlation in consumer valuations.
The economic literature on privacy-while quite young-is growing rapidly. Besides this one, there are several recent articles featuring theoretical treatment of privacy in electronic retailing and price discrimination: Calzolari Unlike the current article, Calzolari and Pavan do not consider the possibility of naive consumers. Also, most of their analysis is couched in the context of full commitment, where they consider the design of an abstract information transmission mechanism rather than explicit sale of a customer list. In essence, one can view Calzolari and Pavan as studying the question concerning the ex ante optimal design of an information-sharing agreement between two firms, while the analysis presented here concerns the ex post sale of customer information in the absence of any prior agreement.
Like Calzolari and Pavan, Acquisti and Varian (forthcoming) study consumer privacy in a setting where a buyer's tastes for two goods are perfectly correlated. Acquisti and Varian, however, are primarily concerned with the design of an optimal pricing policy by a monopolist selling two goods in sequence under conditions of full commitment. Although they do not explicitly consider the sale of a customer list between firms, several of Acquisti and Varian's findings are similar to results presented here. For instance, they find that dynamic pricing is optimal for the monopolist when consumers are naive but not when they are sophisticated. In particular, under full commitment, the revelation principle implies the optimality of eliciting a consumer's private information up front by committing to a long-term price. There are, of course, also some important differences between the settings considered by Acquisti and Varian and this article. For example, under full commitment and in the absence of personalized service offerings, it is optimal for a monopolist to commit to charging either a high price for both goods or a low price for both goods when consumers are sophisticated. As noted above, however, the absence of commitment analyzed here results in a more elastic effective demand for the first good, which may lead to a low price for the first good and a high price for the second one in equilibrium. Dodds (2002) examines a model in which many agents contract sequentially with two principals and in which each agent's "abilities" for performing the two tasks are positively correlated. In Dodd's baseline model, the first principal cannot commit not to sell information about the contract signed by each agent. In this context, several of Dodd's findings are similar in spirit to those presented here. Specifically, Dodds shows that commitment by the first principal to keep contract terms confidential generally benefits the principal but not the agents. Wathieu (2002) shows that under certain circumstances, firms target consumers too finely, sacrificing overall efficiency for the sake of price discrimination. This creates a net opportunity for intermediaries who create value by maintaining coarse consumer access, which is Wathieu's interpretation of the demand for privacy.
There are three other recent articles on privacy in electronic retailing that should be mentioned here. Deck 
To see this formally, note that the population is composed of four types of consumers as distinguished by their valuations (vl, v2). A mass of E[X2] of the consumers have valuations (VH, VH); a mass of E [] -E [2] have valuations (VH, VL); a mass of E [] -E[X2] have valuations (VL, VH); and a mass of 1 -2E []+E[X2] have valuations (VL, VL). Note that the mass of consumers with vl = VH is E[X] and the mass of consumers with vl = VL is 1-E[X]. Using these observations, it is easy to see that the probability that an arbitrary consumer's second-period valuation is v2 = VH given that his first-period valuation was vl = VH is

The confidential regime ?
Since there is no informational linkage between the markets in this benchmark setting, the equilibrium of the two-period game is a simple repetition of the one-shot equilibrium. This result follows from a simple application of mechanism design (see, for example, Bulow and Roberts, 1989). Note that if expected demand is elastic (or unit-elastic), then P1 = P2 = VL, and all consumers purchase both goods with probability one.21 In this case, the payoff to each firm is simply VL, and the expected payoff to a given consumer is 2E
Proposition 1 (the confidential regime
[X](vH -VL). This results in the maximal social surplus of 2(E[X]vH + (1 -E[X])vL).
On the other hand, if expected demand is inelastic, then P1 = P2 = VH, and a given consumer buys good t with probability E[X]. In this case, the payoff to firm t is E [.]vH, and every consumer receives a net payoff of zero. Hence, there is deadweight loss of 2(1 -E[X])VL in this case. This is just the usual monopoly distortion. The firms find it optimal to forgo selling to low-value consumers in order to extract all the surplus from high-value ones. These welfare measures are useful for comparing the equilibrium outcome under the two variants of the disclosure regime studied below.
The market for customer information *
The following simple result characterizes equilibrium play regarding sale of the customer list under the disclosure regime.
Lemma 2 (full extraction). Consider the continuation game beginning at the stage when firm 1 quotes a price for the customer list. If the value to firm 2 from observing the list is strictly positive, then firm 1 quotes a price equal to the value of the information and firm 2 purchases the list with probability one in any PBE. If the value to firm 2 from observing the list is zero, then the payoffs to the firms in any PBE are the same as their payoffs in the PBE in which firm 1 quotes a price of zero and firm 2 purchases the list. This lemma indicates that there is no loss of generality in concentrating on equilibria in which firm 2 purchases the customer list with probability one. Note that firm 1 extracts the full value of any information embodied in the list because it has all the bargaining power.22 An implication of full extraction is that the equilibrium of the game coincides exactly with the situation in which firm 1 and firm 2 are actually a single entity. In other words, it is also appropriate to interpret the model in the context of a single monopolist that sells both goods and that keeps track of its customers' purchasing patterns. information is an important distinction. Naivete is modelled here by supposing that consumers maximize their expected payoff in the first period without regard to how their purchasing decisions will influence the offers they receive in the second period. 
Lemma 3 (the value of information
VH -P1 + VH -P < VH -P holds for P1 E (VL, VH]. In other words, given firm 2's beliefs and concomitant dynamic pricing, all type-(vH, VH) consumers would rather reject (not accept) the offer on good 1 in order to obtain a better offer on good 2. In fact, a similar-but slightly more involved-argument shows that no fraction less than p* of type-(vH, VH) consumers can reject P1 E (VL, VH] in equilibrium.
On the other hand, no fraction higher than p* of the type-(vH, VH) consumers can reject offers P1 C (VL, VH] either. For the intuition, suppose they all rejected such an offer. Then only type-(vH, VL) consumers would buy good 1. Given this, it would be optimal for firm 2 to set 2 = VL. This, however, cannot occur in equilibrium when consumers are sophisticated because
VH -P < VH -P + VH -P holds for p E {VL, VH } and P1 E (VL, VH) .26 In other words, all type-(vH, VH) consumers would
rather accept (not reject) the offer on good 1. Again, the general result follows from a similar-but slightly more involved-argument.
In order to characterize the equilibrium outcome of the entire game under the sophisticatedconsumer setting, define the constant In this case, Lemma 1 indicates that it is (weakly) optimal for firm 2 to set Pi2 = VH even if qi = 0. In other words, refusal to purchase good 1 does not provide a strong enough signal that Vi2 = VL to justify dynamic pricing.
The following welfare observations follow more or less directly from Proposition 4. (Note that firm 2 is always indifferent between the disclosure regime and the confidential regime because it learns no valuable information in either case and consumers behave identically in the second period under either regime. Also, type-(vL, VL) consumers are indifferent between the two regimes because they always receive zero surplus.) Corollary 2 (welfare with sophisticated consumers). When consumers are sophisticated, the following equilibrium welfare comparisons hold. Note that-in contrast to the case of naive consumers-when consumers are sophisticated, firm 1 always (weakly) prefers the confidential regime to the disclosure regime. In other words, firm 1 would like to publicly adopt a policy committing not to sell the customer list or support a public policy that disallows the resale of lists. Without such commitment, it faces strategicdemand reduction that both reduces its sales revenue and undermines the market for information. A commitment not to sell the customer list is, however, not always good for consumers or for social surplus. In particular, the fact that expected demand is more elastic under the disclosure regime can induce firm 1 to post a lower price that generates higher sales volume than under the confidential regime. When expected demand is quite inelastic, however, a commitment not to sell the customer list enhances welfare. While it does not solve the problem of monopoly pricing, it does eliminate the deadweight loss of p*E[k2]vH from strategic-demand reduction.
(i) If E[X] < VL/VH
Conclusion
*
At its core, this article is concerned with property rights. Does a firm have the right to collect and sell valuable information about the identity and purchasing habits of its customers, or do consumers have the right to anonymity? Both settings were analyzed in the context of a simple strategic model without commitment.
It was shown that firms fare well under a customer disclosure regime when consumers do not anticipate the sale of their information. Indeed, in such a setting the opportunity to sell its customer list can provide a firm with incentives to charge high experimental prices. Such experimentation unambiguously lowers welfare because the loss in consumer surplus outweighs the value of the information obtained by the firms. When demand is very inelastic, however, welfare is actually higher under the disclosure regime when consumers are naive because firms offer lower prices to customers who did not previously purchase.
These welfare comparisons are modified sharply if consumers anticipate sale of the list. In this case, some consumers with high valuations engage in strategic-demand reduction when confronted with high prices. This has two important consequences. First, it undermines the market for customer information, since it results in a worthless customer list. Second, effective demand becomes more elastic, which can lead to lower equilibrium prices and higher welfare. Indeed, when consumers anticipate sale of the customer list, the firms would prefer to commit to not selling it, i.e., to adopt a binding privacy policy. Perhaps surprisingly, adoption of such a policy is not always good for welfare.
This article is an early exploration of a vein of research that is rich and relatively untapped. The growing ability of firms to store and recall customer information is reshaping markets and changing the landscape of competition. For instance, one often-proclaimed benefit of a regime with customer recognition is that it reduces consumer search by allowing firms to recommend ? RAND 2004. products and services in accordance with consumer profile data. This potential benefit was not captured in the model presented above, and it would be interesting to see how it might modify the findings. There are also interesting issues concerning the mode of competition in markets where information about customers is fast becoming an essential ingredient for success. Finally, there is a host of open policy questions surrounding privacy rights in electronic retailing. In short, it is safe to say that economists and policy makers are only beginning to understand the social costs and benefits of consumer privacy and the market for customer information. Proof. Consumer i's expected payoff from purchasing good 1 for pi is vi1 -p + l (vi2 -VL), and his expected payoff from refusing to buy good 1 is 0o(vi2 -VL).
Q.E.D.
The next result shows that D1(pl) = 1 if pi < VL and Di(pl) = 0 if pi > VH.
Lemma A2 (no signalling). Consider the continuation game that begins after firm 1 sets pi under the disclosure regime with sophisticated consumers.
(i) If pi < VL, then at least one PBE of the continuation game exists, and all consumers purchase good 1 in every PBE.
(ii) If pi > VH, then at least one PBE of the continuation game exists, and no consumer purchases good 1 in any PBE.
Proof ( The equilibria identified in Lemma A4 are, in fact, the "correct" equilibria of the respective continuation games in the sense that they are the ones that must be played in order to ensure existence of a solution to firm 1's pricing problem and, hence, to a PBE of the entire game.
Proof of Proposition 4. First it is shown that firm 1 optimally posts one of two prices, P1 = VL or pi = VH, and that the customer list is worthless in either case. This takes three steps. 
